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Abstract
This article discusses the position of the littoral States of the body of water known as the 
Caspian Sea (hereinafter ‘the Caspian’), particularly on the basis of their numerous bilateral 
treaties and unilateral statements of action, with respect to the legal status and sui generis 
regimes of the Caspian. It is argued that these States have excluded the possibility that the 
Caspian be equated for legal purposes to a sea, but they have, nonetheless, employed legal 
formulae borrowed from the international law of the sea in order to delimit their respective 
maritime zones and other entitlements. The ambit of these rights is sketchy and they do not 
conclusively cover the entirety of inter-State relations in the Caspian. There is an urgent need 
for the adoption of a multilateral convention in order to remedy these gaps, if for no other 
reason than for the sake of investor confidence and the avoidance of future disputes.
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The Legal Status and Legal Regimes of the Caspian Sea
Much emphasis in the legal literature is placed on the question whether the 
body of water known as the Caspian Sea (hereinafter ‘the Caspian’) should 
best be classified as a ‘sea’, and therefore regulated by the regime established by 
the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),∞ or whether instead 
it should be classified as an ‘enclosed lake’ and thus be subject to the regime of 
∞ United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (done at Montego Bay), 10 December 
1982, in force 16 November 1994, 21 ILM 261 (1982).
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international freshwater resources.1 The five littoral States (i.e., Azerbaijan, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan), despite their public assertions 
as to a future definitive binding conclusion to the legal status of the Caspian,2 
have so far only concerned themselves with the determination of appropriate 
legal regimes♦ so as to satisfy their immediate and short-term political needs 
and objectives.
The two concepts (i.e., ‘legal status’ and ‘legal regimes’) are very different 
and a brief terminological analysis is warranted at this stage. ‘Legal status’ refers 
to a process whereby the status of the Caspian as a geo-morphological entity is 
definitively determined (whether as a sea, a lake, internal waters, other), as are 
also the precise boundary relationships between the littoral States. Both of 
these processes are complementary and inseparable. The determination of a 
particular legal status involves a holistic process, from which other entitlements 
and obligations implicitly or explicitly flow; yet it is clear that in respect of a 
specific object or geographical area, only one legal status can exist, even if that 
status is not recognised by all States, or is otherwise resisted. Conversely, any 
discussion of legal regimes presupposes that in respect of a particular object or 
geographical area one or more State entities are free to modify, amend or abro-
gate existing legal relationships without necessarily modifying the legal status 
of the object or the geographical area. In this manner, the institution of a new 
legal regime may produce legal effects applicable not only between the relevant 
States, but also to third parties. Whether and to what degree these third parties 
may disagree with or oppose wholesale the establishment of bilateral or multi-
lateral legal regimes that produce effects against their interests and from which 
they are excluded are governed by general international law and the terms of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which is considered in a 
subsequent section of this article. The 1969 Vienna Convention generally con-
siders treaty provisions of this nature as inoperable. 
The legal regimes of the Caspian may be numerous, depending on the 
 multilateral needs and demands of the littoral States. Hence, concerns over 
the environment may lead, and have indeed done so, in the establishment of
1 See C.P.R. Romano, ‘The Caspian and International Law: Like Oil and Water?’ in: 
W. Ascher, N. Mirovitskaya (eds.), The Caspian Sea: A Quest for Environmental Security (Kluwer 
International Law, the Hague, 2001) 145; S. Vinogradov, P. Wouters, ‘The Caspian Sea: Cur-
rent Legal Problems’ (1995) 55 ZAORV 604. Three of the Caspian littoral States, namely 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, are not parties to the LOSC.
2 Such a desire was reiterated strongly in the Tehran Declaration on the Caspian of 17 Octo-
ber 2007. See <http://www.tehrantimes.com/NCms/2007.asp?code=155078>.
♦ Insofar as these legal regimes involve declarations and bilateral agreements cited in this article 
that are unavailable in English, these are on file in their original language(s) with this author.
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a multilateral convention that protects the Caspian’s potentially fragile 
ecosystem.3 Concerns over the exploration and ownership of natural resources 
and the laying of submarine pipelines have equally given rise to distinct bilat-
eral hydrocarbon and pipeline regimes, or a lack thereof in respect of several 
actors. Such regimes are independent of one another and to some degree 
reflect the States’ inability to reach agreement on the Caspian’s legal status as 
a whole. 
There is no doubt among legal commentators and the littoral States them-
selves that the Caspian is not a sea for all legal purposes. This conclusion is 
drawn not only from the fact that it has no access to another sea or the ocean,4 
other than through a complex maze of internal waterways, but also from the 
fact that the littoral States have never treated it as a sea in conducting their 
mutual affairs. One would think that the international rules determining the 
legal status of a water body would be premised on objective criteria, and that 
as a corollary the littoral States would not be able to impose their own legal 
classification upon the family of nations, particularly on an issue that is of 
grave importance to the entirety of the international community and which is 
regulated under universal international law. In reality, however, the Caspian 
States have managed to avert an objective legal classification on account of the 
former USSR’s political power and control of the region during the Cold War 
and the lack of commercial interest from other countries up to and during 
that time by which to challenge the Caspian’s legal status. 
The situation has now changed because western companies in Kazakhstan 
(and elsewhere), pump its oil reserves and those same companies wish to 
transfer hydrocarbon deposits through pipelines running under the Caspian, 
rather than through mainland Russia. At the time of writing, however, no 
pipelines traverse the Caspian;5 it is simply dotted with offshore oil and gas 
3 The 2003 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
Caspian Sea [Teheran Convention], 4 November 2003, in force 12 August 2006, 44 ILM 1 
(2005). See B. Janusz, ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Envi-
ronment of the Caspian Sea’ (2005) 4 Chinese JIL 257.
4 LOSC Art. 122.
5 A proposal for a new gas pipeline running under the Caspian is the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipe-
line, which is sponsored by the government of Turkmenistan with the aim of transporting gas 
from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Eastern Europe by circumventing Russia and Iran. 
Both Iran and Russia have vociferously objected to this project on environmental grounds. 
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is composed of Russian interests and circumvents 
the Caspian altogether. Moreover, the recent ravenous Chinese appetite for oil, coupled 
with the very limited reserves of their own, has also forced China to turn to imports from their 
central Asian counterparts. As a result of several buy-outs, the Chinese were instrumental in set-
ting up the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, which does not traverse the body of the Caspian 
50 I. Bantekas / The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26 (2011) 47–58
sites, some of whose ownership is being disputed because of the indetermi-
nate nature of the Caspian’s delimitation. Were the financial interests of the 
littoral States, as well as those of third parties, to be resolved absent agree-
ment on the legal status of this water body, no country would complain, as 
their financial pursuits would be equally served. Thus, the achievement of 
desired regimes has the potential of rendering redundant a multilateral agree-
ment on legal status.
The adoption of a broad legal status may also result in the granting of 
explicit or implicit entitlements to non-littoral States. Thus, were the littoral 
States to agree that the Caspian is a sea for international legal purposes, they 
would have to delineate their respective territorial and other waters—and 
retain sovereignty thereover or sovereign rights thereto—and allow the “high 
seas” of the Caspian to be open to all States, as well as the seabed thereunder.6 
In all maritime zones extensive rights of navigation, among others, would also 
need to be recognised. The current legal status—that is equivalent to a trans-
boundary lake—necessarily excludes any entitlement for non-littoral States, 
by equating the water body to internal waters, over which the coastal States 
retain absolute sovereignty. Although it is clear that the littoral States would 
prefer the latter legal status (i.e., a lake),7 this is not without its share of prob-
lems, because the States concerned must agree among themselves all matters 
relating to boundary delimitation, resource allocation and other legal regimes. 
Let us now examine whether they have achieved any results through their 
bilateral and multilateral relations.
The Advent of Bilateralism 
The Caspian was, until the dissolution of the USSR, bordered by two coun-
tries, Iran and Russia, whose inter-relations were governed by bilateral trea-
ties. Two early agreements, the latter abrogating the former, the 1813 Golestan 
Treaty8 and the 1828 Turkomanchai Treaty,9 ultimately permitted the reten-
tion of only a Russian naval force in the Caspian (Arts. 5 and 8 of the Golestan 
either. See A. Seck, ‘Pipelines from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus: A Maze of Alter-
natives’, in: G.H. Blake, M.A. Pratt and C.H. Schofield (eds.) Boundaries and Energy: Prob-
lems and Prospects (Kluwer International Law, the Hague, London, Boston, 1998) 169–215.
6 In accordance with LOSC Part XI.
7 A Declaration was adopted in 2007 by all littoral States, whose Point 7 stipulates that vessels 
which do not fly the flag of one of the Caspian States would be excluded from entering Cas-
pian waters.
8 62 CTS 435.
9 78 CTS 105.
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and Turkomanchai Treaties, respectively), while granting commercial and 
other private navigation rights to both States. These bilateral agreements are 
not outside the realm of the development of the international law of the sea at 
the time, nor do they constitute exceptions to it. Indeed, the customary devel-
opment of the law of the sea until the early part of the twentieth century was 
squarely premised both on bilateral agreements and the force of unilateral 
acts, given the absence of any multilateral instrument until 1958.
A 1921 Treaty of Friendship and Navigation between Persia (now Iran) and 
Russia10 abrogated the Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828 between the two coun-
tries, reinstating Persia’s right to maintain a naval force, albeit without any 
mention of demarcation. Furthermore, under a subsequent 1935 Treaty of 
Establishment, Commerce and Navigation, each party reserved “to vessels fly-
ing its own flag the right to fish in its coastal waters up to a limit of ten nauti-
cal miles”.11 This 10-nautical-mile fishing regime was once again reaffirmed in 
a 1940 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.12 Besides this feature, however, 
none of these agreements made any reference to maritime delimitation or 
seabed mining. Such a reference was also absent from a 1954 USSR-Iran 
Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Frontier and Financial Questions,13 
which merely determined the land border between the two countries. Although 
this “shared use” or “common sea” principle is evident from the aforemen-
tioned USSR-Iran treaties,14 in practice, the USSR for many years carried out 
exploitation of the Caspian in the area of Azerbaijan in excess of 10 nautical 
miles from the coast without ever offering any of its proceeds to Iran or in any 
way involving Iran in its operations.15 
The problems associated with the absence of a precise delimitation became 
apparent with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. Russia and Iran had— 
in relative terms—the least amount of coastal access to the Caspian and were 
farther from its rich oil deposits than the other littoral States, in particular 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Each State, therefore, naturally sought to estab-
lish a regime that would best serve its interests. The first problem was the suc-
cession of the new independent States to the USSR-Persian treaties on the 
10 9 LNTS 383.
11 176 LNTS 301.
12 144 BFSP (1940–42) 419.
13 451 UNTS 250.
14 Iranian scholars generally take the view that, from the period between 1922 to 1991, the 
USSR had not accepted that the Caspian was a condominium between itself and the USSR. 
See K.A. Hosseyn, ‘Legal Regime of Caspian Sea: Development of Sources and Energetic 
Roots’ (1997) 1 Amu-Darya Iranian Journal on the Study of Central Asia 17.
15 B.M. Clagett, ‘Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil Resources in the Caspian Sea under the 
Rules of International Law’ (1995) 1 Caspian Crossroads Magazine 1 at 2.
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Caspian. Although this problem was overcome by the Alma Ata Declaration 
of 21 December 1991,16 according to which succeeding States agreed to hon-
our the treaties ratified by the former USSR subject to their own  constitutional 
arrangements, these early Caspian treaties were silent on the Caspian’s own 
legal status and delimitation. Thus, the only elements succeeded to were the 
right to commercial navigation, 10-nautical-mile coastal fishing and presum-
ably the right to military navigation. In any event, the main concern is not 
whether Russia and Iran could legally demand that the new republics be pre-
vented from gaining access to the Caspian, because the latter are naturally 
entitled to this, given their proximity to the coastline and their succession to 
the relevant treaties. 
The competing interests underlie the desires of the littoral States to exploit 
the Caspian’s rich resources. In March 1997, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
reached an Agreement on a sectoral division of the Caspian through the use of 
equidistant lines. In the following year, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reached 
a basic understanding on division of the seabed, again through the drawing 
of equidistant lines.17 Bilateral seabed agreements were later adopted on 
29 November 2001 and 27 February 2003 between Kazakhstan and Azerbai-
jan, and on 14 May 2003 between the latter two and Russia. These States 
agreed on the junction point of the demarcation lines of the Caspian’s seabed.18 
Moreover, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement on delimitation of the 
depth of the north part of the Caspian Sea in July 1998. Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan signed an agreement on delimitation of the depth of the Caspian 
Sea and a protocol to the agreement on 29 November 2001 and 27 February 
2003, respectively. An agreement on the border depth of the Caspian Sea was 
signed between Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan on 14 May 2003. These 
agreements relate almost exclusively to delimitation and it is natural that the 
littoral States have resorted to further bilateral or multilateral agreements, in 
order to settle other issues, such as the protection of the marine environment.19 
Although the Teheran Convention envisages a collaborative procedure between 
16 31 ILM 148 (1992).
17 K. Mehdiyoun, ‘Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian’ (2000) Am J Intl L 
178 at 187–188.
18 ‘Caspian Littoral States Agree to Disagree’ (21 June 2007), News Central Asia, available at: 
<http://www.newscentralasia.net/print/52.html>.
19 See, e.g., the Teheran Convention, op. cit., supra note 3. Art 22 of this Convention estab-
lishes a Conference of Parties that is responsible for enhancing it with new protocols and for 
monitoring. Four protocols have been adopted by September 2010. All five Caspian littoral 
States are parties. See also the website of the Caspian Environmental Program, available at: 
<http://www.caspianenvironment.org/newsite/index.htm>.
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the littoral States in cases of accidents or polluting incidents, fortunately no 
accidents have been reported from offshore wells or pipelines.20
It must be noted, however, that although the use of equidistant lines was 
agreed, no agreement was reached on how such lines were to be drawn. On 
6 July 1998 Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to a bilateral division of the north-
ern part of the Caspian seabed on the basis of an equidistant line.21 This bilat-
eral Agreement was nonetheless confined only to delimitation of the seabed, 
whereas the waters of the Caspian were deemed to be common property 
among all littoral States.22 All other matters were to be regulated jointly, and 
the conclusion of sectoral agreements to delimit zones for border, custom and 
sanitary controls were also envisaged. Moreover, the same terms were incorpo-
rated in a Declaration on the Principles of Cooperation in the Caspian Sea 
between Azerbaijan and Russia, adopted in January 2001. Yet, in March 2001, 
Iran and Russia signed a Joint Declaration, in which they declared that nei-
ther of them would recognise bilateral boundary agreements until all five 
nations reach a common agreement.23 In 2003 Kazakhstan and Russia adopted 
a further Agreement on the Caspian, by agreeing on the joint development of 
oil and gas deposits situated on the border of their respective sectors.24
Iran has not embarked on any bilateral agreements, perhaps because no 
other littoral State is inclined to share its view that each State should receive 
an equal portion of the Caspian, regardless of coastal size;25 this is of course 
advantageous for Iran because it possesses the smallest coastline among its 
other littoral counterparts. This position is acutely antithetical to that of the 
other littoral States. Kazakhstan has consistently held that each Caspian State 
possesses an independent unilateral entitlement to explore mineral resources 
in its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, that exclusive fishing 
zones should be established and that landlocked Caspian States should have 
access to the Caspian through Russian waterways on the basis of distinct 
20 For a thorough analysis of relevant issues, see C.C. Joyner, K.Z. Walters, ‘The Caspian 
Conundrum: Reflections on the Interplay between Law, the Environment and Geopolitics’ 
(2006) 21 IJMCL 173.
21 See Romano, op. cit., supra note 1 at 145.
22 See Letter dated 5 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Fed-
eration to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/49/475 
(1994).
23 M. Lelyveld, ‘Caspian: Outlook Dims for Summit,’ Radio Free Europe (15 May 2001).
24 S. Grachev, ‘Russian-Kazakh Agreement on Caspian Opens Opportunities for Investors,’ 
(March 2003) 1 OGEL, available at: <http://www.gasandoil.com/ogel/samples/freearticles/
article_17.htm>.
25 See ‘the Position of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the legal regime of the Caspian 
Sea,’ UN Doc A/52/324 (8 Sep. 1997).
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 bilateral agreements.26 This line of reasoning assumes elements from both the 
international law of the sea regime (particularly the references to a territorial 
sea and an exclusive economic zone) and is at least consistent with  Kazakhstan’s 
1997 Agreement with Russia delimiting their respective sectors through equi-
distant lines. This consistency is evident in a Joint Statement of 27 February 
1997 between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, according to which the two 
States agreed to delimit their maritime borders on the basis of a line running 
through the middle of the sea, which itself is premised on the USSR’s admin-
istrative delimitation of these two Republics’ respective boundaries.27 
Although the parties do not generally recognise the applicability of the 
LOSC to the Caspian, the use of delimitation formulae found in this Con-
vention reveals the lack of any common rules upon which the littoral States 
can delimit their boundaries and coastal entitlements. It is not only Kazakh-
stan that has relied on the delimitation rules of the LOSC, but also others, 
such as Azerbaijan, as a matter of practical necessity.28
From the maze of the agreements referred to above, a certain normative 
position is certainly discernible. Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan seem to 
be in agreement on exclusive sectoral delimitation as regards the northern part 
of the Caspian, which encompasses sovereignty over all resources on and 
below the surface waters and the seabed. The three States aim to adopt a tri-
lateral agreement to solidify their bilateral practices. Despite this observation, 
numerous uncertainties still exist. Chief among these is whether Azeri and 
Kazakh vessels have access to the Volga river waterways on the basis of their 
bilateral agreements with Russia. In the opinion of this author the answer to 
this question is negative given that Russia has strenuously guarded its sover-
eignty over the Volga-Don Canal, which it may employ as a strategic bargain-
ing tool in the near future. On the other hand, the legal status of the south 
Caspian is indeterminate. At the very least none of the three northern States 
can deny the availability of sectoral delimitation to Iran and Turkmenistan as 
a matter of estoppel.
26 ‘The Position of Kazakhstan on the legal status of the Caspian Sea,’ UN Doc A/52/424 
(3 Oct. 1997).
27 ‘Joint statement on the questions related to the Caspian Sea,’ signed by the President of 
Kazakhstan and the President of Turkmenistan in Almaty on February 27, 1997, UN Doc 
A/52/93 (17 March 1997).
28 ‘Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan,’ (10 Dec. 
1998), UN Doc A/53/741 (14 Dec. 1998).
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The Legal Effects of Bilateralism
As if the complex maze of bilateralism was not enough, some Caspian States 
adopted unilateral measures aimed at giving domestic effect to the dictates of 
their foreign policy. Turkmenistan, for example, promulgated a Law on State 
Borders in 1992, by which it claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles. It later 
issued offshore exploration licences in this maritime belt, as did Iran in 2000 
and Azerbaijan prior to the Turkmen action. The Kazakh government invited 
investors to express declarations of interest in exploring the potential of the 
Kashagan offshore field, whose oil wealth is the primary motivation for the 
construction of the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline.29 Thus, in one form or 
another, all of the Caspian States have treated as an implicit entitlement the 
drawing of at least a territorial sea under the general rules of international law 
applicable to seas. 
What are we to make of all these bilateral agreements, the special regimes 
and the unilateral acts? Can they all be applicable simultaneously and how can 
problems be resolved when these are found to conflict with one another? 
Equally, what legal effects, if any, should these agreements have on States that 
are not parties thereto, irrespective of whether they are Caspian or other third 
States? To respond meaningfully to these questions we must be guided by 
certain undisputed principles of international law. The first is that formal 
agreements bind only those States that are parties to them, in accordance with 
Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Hence, 
third parties are not bound, unless they explicitly consent, or do so tacitly 
particularly through subsequent practice, by assenting to the obligations 
encompassed in such a treaty.30 Second, unilateral acts are indeed legal acts 
and produce international legal effects for the acting State. Although other 
States are not bound by the unilateral acts of a particular country, failure to 
make their opposition known may be later deemed as acquiescence. Third, 
States cannot unilaterally alter their international frontiers or do so as a result 
of State succession, or restrict the original rights pertaining thereto.31 Finally, 
States do not have the authority to abrogate as to themselves existing custom-
ary international law or jus cogens norms,32 even by means of a new treaty.
29 See R. Gaishin, ‘Regulation of Oil and Gas Transportation by Pipelines in Kazakhstan,’ in: 
I. Bantekas, J. Paterson (eds.) Oil and Gas Law in Kazakhstan: National and International 
Perspectives (Kluwer International Law, the Hague, 2004), 312 et seq. 
30 Arts. 35 and 36, 1969 Vienna Convention, (1155 UNTS 331).
31 Arts. 11 and 12, 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States, 23 August 1978, in 
force 6 November 1996, 1946 UNTS 3.
32 Art. 53, 1969 Vienna Convention.
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Amazingly, the bilateral treaties do not seem to be conflicting, for the sole 
reason that in practice all Caspian States accept the sectoral division of their 
maritime and seabed belts in accordance with an outer limit premised partly 
on the international law of the sea—although, as we have seen, Iran is reluc-
tant to accept the full application of this principle, given that it possesses the 
smallest coastline. Although the drawing of maritime belts is inconsistent in 
terms of their outward limit, or as to whether in fact a contiguous or exclusive 
zone has been subject to a common understanding, or even on the method for 
drawing baselines, the five littoral States seem to agree that a 12-nautical-mile 
maximum delimitation is mutually acceptable. Similar, yet even less precise, 
consensus exists with respect to the seabed beneath each national territorial 
sea. Thus, although the bilateral treaties cannot bind third parties, they are all 
adhering to the same principle and give rise to a rule—of perhaps regional 
customary value—of territorial waters delimitation, abrogating thus any 
notion of condominium, initially supported by Iran. The Caspian is, there-
fore, treated as a sui generis sea for all legal purposes between the littoral States, 
and as a lake that is non-accessible to all non-Caspian States. Given the cus-
tomary rule that borders are not susceptible to change by reason of State suc-
cession, it follows that the delimitation of the respective territorial seas is 
determined by reference to the administrative borders inherited following the 
dissolution of the USSR; the same logic, therefore, applies to the seaward 
extension of these borders to the Caspian water mass. All littoral States evi-
dently respect in their bilateral agreements these boundaries to which they 
succeeded and they do not claim any rights in maritime zones falling within 
the territorial sea of their neighbours. Moreover, these States have already 
consented to free and unimpeded commercial navigation and all of them are 
responsible, jointly and severally, for the Caspian’s environmental protection. 
It has also been established, on the basis of unilateral acts and bilateral treaties, 
that exploration of oil and gas reserves within declared territorial waters is 
permissible.
However, the following issues as to the legal status of the Caspian are unre-
solved. First, there is no consensus among the littoral States as to the mutual 
recognition of a contiguous zone or an exclusive fisheries (or economic) zone, 
despite the bilateral agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan. This bilateral 
agreement may be taken as a tacit understanding among all littoral States in 
the absence of any protest, but one needs to be cautious in making such a 
broad statement. The only certainty about a fishing regime is that contained 
in the USSR-Iran treaties of the twentieth century, which envisage a 10-nautical-
mile exclusive fishing zone. In the absence of any conflicts or objections to the 
contrary, it may be presumed that beyond the 10-nautical-mile zone, all States 
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may fish freely, subject to Article 14 of the 2003 Teheran Convention and its 
Protocols, which militate against the depletion of marine life and damaging 
forms of fishing. 
As regards placing submerged oil and gas pipelines on the seabed of the 
Caspian, the attitude of the littoral States strongly suggests that they do not 
aspire to the regime of LOSC Article 87(1)(c), which provides a general free-
dom to lay pipelines beneath the high seas. The official Russian position is 
that an agreement among all littoral States is required for such an undertaking 
and equally the Iranians have long maintained that the regime of the 1940 
bilateral treaty is still valid, which does require the consent of all littoral States.33 
This position is maintained by Russia and Iran and, although it is not shared 
by other former USSR republics, which had for some time discussed the 
design and implementation of the Trans-Caspian Pipeline with foreign inves-
tors but eventually had to pull the plug, it does not seem that they have any 
choice in the matter. There is moreover no agreement on a sui generis conti-
nental shelf regime between the coastal States and this will remain an open 
matter. 
Moreover, a comprehensive agreement on maritime delimitation as regards 
adjacent coastlines does not exist. A comprehensive agreement of this nature 
would not generally be required, save for the fact that in the declarations and 
legal actions of the littoral States, comprehensive delimitation seems to be the 
preferred choice. With some exceptions, particularly the Kazakh-Russian 
bilateral agreement, where the delimitation of their adjacent coastlines is 
determined on the basis of the equidistance principle, this matter has not 
been resolved through bilateral agreement between the other littoral States. In 
all probability, a future agreement, or a string of further bilateral agreements, 
will provide for the widest possible application of the equidistance principle, 
but one can never be certain before this is incorporated in a binding instru-
ment, particularly because in an era of energy insecurity and soaring prices, 
some of the most potent actors may eventually decide otherwise.
Although this study demonstrates the benefits of bilateralism, particularly 
where the littoral States are able to come to some sort of agreement on funda-
mental issues, this can turn out as a wholly negative exercise where the parties’ 
negotiating position seeks to compensate for other issues. For example, until 
1997 Turkmenistan had maintained an agreement with Azerbaijan on the 
drawing of equidistant lines, and the Azeri side had undertaken a number of 
offshore oil and gas investments on the basis of this express understanding. 
33 S. Blagov, ‘Russia Tries to Scuttle Proposed Trans-Caspian Pipeline’ (28 March 2006) avail-
able at: <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav032806.shtml>.
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Yet, since 1997 the Turkmen side has altered its stance, disagreeing on the 
point from which the median line should be drawn, arguing that this should 
be consistent with the relevant rules under the LOSC.34 The rationale for 
this change of stance is premised on a desire to assume ownership over any 
one—or all—of the three major offshore deposits currently controlled and 
exploited by the Azeris,35 namely Chirag, Kapaz and Azeri. No doubt, this is 
contrary to a relative acquiescence by Turkmenistan in the status quo ante over 
time—despite the fact that no formal agreement had been reached. The Turk-
men position is not untenable or unreasonable, but its isolationist politics 
until the mid-2000s left it out of Caspian geopolitics. It is now making efforts 
to make up for lost time against countries such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan 
that have received European, US and Russian backing since their indepen-
dence and have set up formidable natural resources industries.
Finally, the position of third, non-Caspian, States is that they have no rights 
of navigation or of any other nature as regards the Caspian. Caspian States are 
adamant that not even third States that are land-locked have access to its 
“high seas”, unless express consent is granted. Even if the Caspian were to be 
classified as a sea by the littoral countries, third States would still be barred in 
practice from any navigational or other rights because their ships would need 
to traverse the internal waters of the littoral States, especially the Volga-Don 
canal of Russia, thus requiring their permission.
34 ‘Statement on Turkmenistan’s Position on Delimitation of Caspian Seabed and Resources’ 
(27 Jan 2005) available at: <http://turkmeniya.tripod.com/turkmenistanlaws/id23.html>.
35 The Azeri government entered into an agreement with a BP-led consortium as far back as 
1994 for the exploitation of some of these offshore wells. In 1997 the Azeri State Oil Com-
pany (SOCAR) signed a contract with the Russian companies Rosneft and Lukoil for the 
exploitation of the Kapaz site. Rosneft withdrew a year later because of Turkmen insistence on 
the legal status of the site.
